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"Any government, however objectionable, is better than none at 
all; and between two evils we must choose the lesser" i.  
 
"Sixty years of an unjust imam are better than one night without 
a sultan" ii. 
 
"The nearer a man is to government, the further he is from God" 
iii. 
 
Western Portraits of Muslim Rule 
  Historically, the Western image of Muslim rule has been one 
of absolutism and tyranny, while the West, in contrast, has been 
seen to favor citizenship and participatory government.  This is 
perhaps most famously stated by Hegel, who wrote: "the East knew 
and to the present day knows only that One is Free; the Greek 
and Roman World that Some are Free; and the German World knows 
that All are free" iv.   
 Hegel here follows Machiavelli, who argued that, unlike Europe, 
where monarchs' powers were limited by the rights and privileges 
of the estates, the Middle Eastern Sultan ruled without 
constraint, by personal fiat and with unconditional authority. 
For such a ruler, the populace were simply human resources, 
without rights or the capacity for self-determination, to be 
exploited by him for his personal aggrandizement.  
 Montesquieu took the same path, and coined the term 'Oriental 
despotism' to describe an absolute and capricious monarchy 
ruling without qualification over a populace governed solely by 
fear and coercion.  The type case of Oriental despotism was the 
Ottoman Empire, which Montesquieu portrayed as the negating all 
private property and individual liberty. 
 In the 19th century, Montesquieu's model of Oriental despotism 
retained its hold over Max Weber, who called the most extreme 
form of traditional patrimonial power by an Arabic name - 
'Sultanism'.  This 'ideal type' of authority, which Weber saw as 
characteristic of the Middle East, was described as an 
arbitrary, personalized form of kingship, marked by overlapping, 
incoherent and whimsical administrative and judicial 
institutions staffed not on the basis of ability but on the 
basis of loyalty to the ruler.  The Sultan himself reigned 
without any purpose beyond simply the retention and enjoyment of 
the pleasures of domination; his minions existed merely to curry 
his favor and to extract plunder from the realm, and the people 
were an inert source of revenue v. 
 Latter-day 'Orientalists' continue to hold a Weberian view of 
Islamic polity.  For example, in a highly influential work, 
H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen write that the Ottoman state 
generally consisted of "rights acquired by force and maintained 
by force (in) a state whose institutions are inspired by fear 
and mistrust, where loyalty is discounted and honesty can be 
secured only by threat of punishment" vi.  Similarly, Peter 
Hardy, writing about the Mughals, says:  "the ruler's authority 
is more often than not acknowledged purely because of its 
factual reality - he leads because can attract and hold 
followers by whatever means he has at his disposal, including 
bribery, persuasion or coercion. He himself has no special 
'calling' to rule, and no need to seek rationalization for his 
authority beyond the actuality of power itself" vii.  These dark 
assessments are typical of modern scholarly European 
understanding of premodern forms of Muslim government in the 
Middle East.  How true are they? 
The Indigenous Islamic Image of Secular Power  
 It has been cogently argued that the negative views I have 
outlined here of an unfree and submissive society ruled by the 
tyrant's personal domination over a population both terrorized 
and torpid is simply a European fantasy, one that fits only too 
well with Western prejudice against the Muslim world, since it 
serves both to demonize Islam and to legitimize domination over 
Muslim peoples. viii.  Yet, although we must be on our guard 
against accepting at face value one-sided Western notions of 
'Oriental despotism', we must also recognize that these notions 
are not drawn from thin air, but rather correspond with 
historical records which show a general acceptance of the brute 
fact of power as its own justification.   
 In fact, portraits of traditional Muslim states are painted in 
extremely harsh colors in the writings of some of Islam's most 
influential thinkers. For example, Al-Ghazali, perhaps the 
greatest theorist of Islamic practice since Muhammad, wrote in 
the 11th century (400 years after the beginnings of Islam) that 
"government in these days is a consequence solely of military 
power, and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military 
power professes his allegiance, that person is the Caliph" ix. 
   Three centuries later, Ibn Jama`a, chief qadi (judge) of 
Egypt, baldly asserts that "if the office of imam is vacant... 
and there aspires to it one who does not possess the 
qualifications for it but who imposes himself on the people by 
his might and his armies... obedience to him is compulsory... 
this is in no way invalidated by his being barbarous or an evil-
doer, according to the most authoritative opinion" x.  Ibn Jama`a 
goes on to argue that "the sovereign has a right to govern until 
another and stronger one shall oust him from power and rule in 
his stead.  The latter will rule by the same title and will have 
to be acknowledged on the same grounds" xi.  These statements are 
unusual in their starkness, but by no means unrepresentative of 
traditional Muslim political thought among respected jurists and 
philosophers. 
 The justification of authority advanced in these texts goes far 
beyond the validation of Roman sovereignty, which was in 
principle wielded on behalf of private citizens who had certain 
inalienable rights and privileges.  Rather, the Muslim version 
supports the use of force by a dictator to coerce and control a 
populace who have no enfranchisement whatsoever; this means that 
a ruler need make no claims to pursue any goal save his own 
personal benefit.  It was enough for him to hold the reins 
tightly and not to overtly transgress the relatively loose 
boundaries of Muslim practice.  As the ruler of Egypt proclaimed 
to Jacob Burkhardt in 1829: "a great king knows nothing but his 
sword and his purse; he draws the one to fill the other; there 
is no honor among conquerors!" xii.  
 It is evident that such a philosophy had no room for any 
pretense of ruling via 'the will of the people'.  This truth is 
symbolized in the term for the ruled in the Ottoman Empire; they 
were  ra`iya, meaning literally "cattle at pasture", and from 
the Sultan's point of view they were indeed made to be milked, 
since "the first and principal object of government was the 
levying and collection of taxes" xiii.  These taxes were not 
justified as improving the public welfare.  Instead, the money 
collected was understood by the populace and the rulers 
primarily as a prize extorted by the powerful from the weak, 
which served to pay the army and support the luxurious life 
styles of the Sultan and his minions.  
 From the point of view of the ra`iya, then, government was an 
onerous and dangerous institution that was imposed from without, 
to be escaped from if feasible, submitted to if necessary, and 
manipulated if possible.  For the ruler, power allowed one to 
assert one's will over others and to live in splendor.  If one 
was governed, it was a misfortune that had to be borne; if one 
ruled, it was an opportunity for self-aggrandizement and the 
expression of personal will.  Of course, there were exceptions, 
but in general, this was the indigenous image of government that 
prevailed throughout the Middle East until the advent of 
Colonialism, and continues to prevail to an extent today. 
  For instance, despite the fact that it has the most 
continuity of rule of any Middle Eastern state, Morocco 
nonetheless has been marked by "a constantly rearranging 
kaleidoscope of political constellations, centering around 
rising and falling strong men" xiv; in this context the state was 
popularly represented as serving only to monopolize "large scale 
injustice", and was spoken of as a "machine less for the 
governing of men... than for the amassment and consumption of 
the material rewards of power"  xv. 
 Thus, as Fredrik Barth writes, in Middle Eastern secular 
polities:  "It is the fact of effective control and ascendancy - 
not its formal confirmation or justification - that is 
consistently pursued."  The leader is simply the "dominant fact 
in the political field" without any special claim to legitimacy 
beyond the brute fact of actually dominating his fellows, 
primarily by means of fear, manipulation and bribery xvi.  The 
ruler is 'first among equals' in the sense that he has managed 
to control, coerce and subordinate his fellows, but they only 
accept his rule so long as he has the ability to maintain it; 
legitimacy ceases with a demonstration of weakness, and those 
who follow are always ready to try their own hand at rule.   
 In such a society there is no value placed on 'being a good 
citizen' and obeying the laws of the realm, since these laws are 
seen as an expression of the ruler's personal coercive power.  
Paying taxes is considered especially demeaning, since taxes are 
considered a form of tribute.  The only escape from the coercive 
and humiliating reign of the state is to live in the 'lands of 
dissidence' that traditionally existed in the deserts and 
mountains of every Middle Eastern state.  Here tribal xvii 
peoples bragged of their freedom and the honor they gained by 
resisting the state's demands.  
 The deep polarity between the favored land of the 'free' and the 
oppressive land of the 'governed' has been consistently reported 
throughout the Middle East, where "insofar as a person is 
obliged to defer to the wishes of others, his autonomy and 
social honor are diminished" xviii.  Therefore, as Ernest Gellner 
writes, tribesmen who could make claims to independence also 
made claims to living an ideal life, as opposed to "the sheep 
who have submitted to authority, thereby betraying a loss of 
moral fibre that might make them royal, and losing it ever more 
completely through the habits of submission" xix.  Throughout the 
Middle East, "only those who refuse to be governed are 
themselves fit to rule: political education is to be had in the 
wilderness alone.  If you wish to command you must learn not to 
obey" xx. 
 The point to be stressed here is that none of those who actually 
do manage to command in this context have any intrinsic right to 
rule beyond the actual fact of holding power - there is no real 
'legitimacy' in the Weberian sense except the religiously 
sanctioned belief in the necessity of some central power in 
order to offset chaos.  For rulers, domination over others is 
simply a desirable end to be pursued pragmatically and 
ruthlessly by all who have the ambition, will, strength, guile 
and drive to take part in the struggle for power over their less 
capable brothers.  In general, then, the Weberian image of 
Sultanism does correlate with historical and ethnographic 
reality. 
 The Millennial Past and the Delegitimization of Authority 
 So far, I have tried to show that the classical Western image of 
Middle Eastern despotism does have a large degree of truth in 
it.  The relevant question then is why should tyranny and the 
absence of a sphere of public participation be so little opposed 
in this cultural world?  For many theorists this lack was often 
understood as simply due to an Islamic 'essence' that favored 
popular passivity on the one hand, and authoritarianism on the 
other.  But here I want to present quite a different argument, 
one that owes a great deal to Weber, but that does not accept 
his conclusions.  This is that Middle Eastern despotism 
paradoxically is derived from a matrix of transcendental hope 
and a potent faith in human equality and dignity. To make my 
case, I shall refer very briefly to two factors that are 
centrally important for Middle Eastern political culture: the 
first is historical, the second is structural.   
 In looking at Muslim history, it is absolutely crucial to recall 
that Muhammad, the 'seal of the prophets', was not, like Jesus, 
willing to 'render unto Caesar'.  Instead, he and his immediate 
successors presided over an unprecedented political and military 
expansion of Islam, which burst from the desolate hinterlands of 
Arabia in a whirlwind of conquest and conversion.  It is as if 
Jesus had led the Israelites to subdue Jerusalem, and Peter had 
become the Roman Emperor.  This millennial past placed a stamp 
upon the whole of Middle Eastern history, marking it with a 
sense of both loss and hope that is quite different from the 
Judeo-Christian tradition.  Let me elaborate on this point for a 
moment. 
 Because of the great conquests made by Muhammad and his 
followers, for Muslims the 'City of God' has never been 
understood as transcending the secular world, to be achieved by 
faith and renunciation.  Instead, it existed in reality, under 
the authority of the Prophet himself and the four pious Caliphs 
who succeeded him and commanded the community (umma) of the 
faithful in the holy jihad against the unbelievers xxi.  Unlike 
other religions, Islam did not require either a reconciliation 
with practical facts of power and domination, or a virtuoso 
retreat into contemplation or asceticism. - there is in fact no 
spiritual elite in orthodox Sunni Islam xxii.  Instead, ordinary 
men willingly joined the brotherhood of co-equal believers and 
acted together to lay claim to actual and successful practice of 
the Prophetic message in the real world - a claim validated by 
massive political triumphs xxiii.  In this period the public 
world of community action, the kingdom of God, the sovereign 
state, and even the economy, all coincided. 
 During the millennial era of Islam's first thirty years, the 
Muslim state apparatus was simply considered to be the ordained 
earthly institution responsible for implementing divinely 
revealed law, the shari`a, and for protecting the sacred 
community, the umma; the Caliph himself was conceived to be and 
understood himself as the instrument of the law and the chosen 
representative of the people.  He could not make or unmake 
shari`a, he merely had the obligation to see it was enforced.  
His election was by his fellows, his responsibilities were 
clear, his office was contractual, and he was initiated into his 
office by Muslim scholars, the ulema, with a handshake that 
symbolized the binding oath between himself and his co-equal 
brothers in the faith.   
 The archetypical model for the relationship between ruler and 
ruled was the 'Constitution of Medina', the earliest document in 
Islam.  It consisted of a pragmatic contract between Mohammed 
and co-equal groups of tribesmen, agreed to after bargaining, in 
which the tribes linked themselves together in a co-operative 
and protective confederation, with Mohammed accepted by all as 
judge and arbiter xxiv.  This new confederation was centered 
around a sacred spot (haram) in which violence was prohibited 
and where justice was dispensed.  In form, the 'Constitution' 
resembled historical agreements made between tribes and saintly 
lineages throughout Arabia to provide protected spots for trade 
and mediation xxv.  Muhammad himself, though the spokesman of 
Allah, was also specifically recognized by the tribes and by 
himself as nothing more than an ordinary man.  What was relevant 
were the sacred laws he enunciated, which became the basis for 
the shari`a all later Muslim rulers should follow. 
 Originally, then, Islam entailed a relationship of trust and 
reciprocal benefit between leader and followers agreed to after 
discussion and cemented by oath - a real 'social contract' 
binding free participants who together created a community with 
a sacred foundation xxvi.  As a sympathetic observer writes, "the 
purpose of the Islamic State, at its very inception, was the 
general good with the superior aim of achieving the 'highest 
good'... under divine sanctions" xxvii.   
 In this era, the government's sole function was "the protection 
and defense of the faith not the state.  For at the heart of 
Islamic political doctrine lies neither the state, nor the 
individual, nor yet a social class, but the umma, the Islamic 
community tied by bonds of faith alone" xxviii.  So, in Islam, 
ideally, all members of the faith have an equal right to 
participate in the public world of the sacred society, and the 
ruler was simply guardian of these rights.  A letter from the 
last 'authentic' Caliph, the Prophet's son-in-law, `Ali, to his 
newly appointed governor of Egypt gives the flavor of authority 
in these early years of Islam. `Ali writes:  
"Let the dearest treasure to you be the treasure of 
virtuous acts.  Control, therefore, your desires and 
appetites.... Let your heart be imbued with mercy for 
your subjects as well as love and kindness for 
them.... and never say, 'I am your overlord (because) 
I order and am obeyed', for such ideas corrupt the 
heart and weaken the faith.... And when the power you 
enjoy produces vanity and arrogance in your mind, look 
at the greatness of the kingdom of God above you.... 
for God humiliates every tyrant or oppressor and 
disgraces every braggart" xxix. 
 
 But this Golden period could not and did not last.  The governor 
`Ali had dispatched to Egypt with such laudable advice was 
treacherously poisoned, and `Ali himself was defeated and killed 
by the despotic Mu`awiya, who ascended to the position of Caliph 
in 661.  Muslims who had been members of a free community bound 
by a sanctified contract now gradually found themselves trapped 
in a world ever more despotic and fragmented.  
 Islamic scholars were thus faced with a terrible quandary, since 
the Caliphate was the necessary political arm of divine law, yet 
the men who filled the position no longer had sacred qualities, 
nor were they elected and controlled by the umma. The Muslim 
world, once united under the religious/political leadership of 
the 'rightly guided' companions of the Prophet, was now instead 
ruled by men whose power came only from the sword.  The 
Caliphate itself rapidly lost strength, until by the 10th 
century the Caliph was merely the plaything of military sultans, 
who remained the Caliph's subordinates in name only.  How could 
this apparent rupture of the divine contract be explained and 
accepted?   
  The ulema and the community of believers were naturally 
unwilling to admit the failure of the Muslim millennial dream, 
and argued instead for the 'degeneration of the times' (fasad 
az-zaman); the cruelty and injustice of arbitrary rule was then 
conceptualized as a scourge of God that had to be accepted by 
the faithful as punishment for their inability to live up to the 
standards of the founders.  
 The Golden Age, however, was never given up as irretrievably 
lost.  Rather, it remains to this day as the "historical model 
for every society in every age that would be properly muslim, or 
submissive to the will of God.  The utopian blueprint is 
available as a realized era of the historical past, which makes 
it all the more compelling as a realizable possibility in every 
age" xxx.  The ulema therefore continued to have faith that as 
long as the Caliphate existed, if only in a counterfeit form, 
there remained hope for a return to the original millennial 
state.   
 In consequence, as Von Erwin Rosenthal notes, "with political 
effectiveness waning to the point of disappearance, the 
religious nature of the Caliphal office was stressed more and 
more" xxxi.  These impotent princes were now given grandiose 
spiritual titles which the original Caliphs had eschewed, such 
as "the shadow of God", and their names were inscribed on the 
coins of kingdoms where they had no actual power xxxiiq. But the 
attempt to save appearances could not continue indefinitely, 
especially as the Empire broke apart into distinct and often 
warring units.  By 1037, the pretense of a single Caliphate was 
abandoned to accommodate the undeniable reality of independent 
Spain.  
 The psychological and political consequences of this process of 
desacralization were profound.  All over the Islamicate, 
imperial power "became illegitimate in the most literal sense of 
the word.... Kings were rejected as Pharaohs and priests as 
golden calves" xxxiii.  Muslim kings, now ruling without divine 
sanction, were unable to "pose as the instrument of salvation 
for their subjects" and men of reputation, fearing the taint of 
dishonor, often would "set political ambitions aside" and not 
deign to enter government service.  There was, in sum, "a self-
conscious understanding that society needed government and yet, 
by and large, did not want to generate any government of its 
own" xxxiv.  A delegitimization of public life itself insofar as 
it was associated with the state became deeply embedded in the 
culture of the Middle East.   
 Clearly, then, Ibn Jama`a's pragmatic command to obey a tyrant 
is not, as it might seem, an indication of an absence of any 
coherent and compelling notion of legitimate authority and 
citizenship.  Rather, it is a consequence of the experience of 
the original charismatic community gathered around the Prophet 
at Mecca and Medina; an experience continually recalled to 
collective memory by religious ritual and discourse. Unable to 
preserve this sacred community except in recollection,  Muslims 
became disenchanted with and detached from secular governments 
which could not live up to their standards.  The rationalization 
of the charismatic millennialism of Muhammad's message thus did 
not occur as Weber thought it must.  Rather, stimulated by 
memories of the Prophetic moment, Islamdom has been marked by a 
deep contempt for the mundane realities of politics as usual.  
The act of governance has consequently stripped of any ethical 
value, leaving the state as the prize in contests between human 
wolves.  
Equality and Power 
 Principled disillusionment with secular authority after the fall 
of the Caliphate is, however, not the only source of Muslim 
antipathy toward participation in government.  The social 
structure of the region also was conducive to a withdrawal from 
public life, while simultaneously offering an alternative 
location for moral discourse. It is to this aspect of Middle 
Eastern culture that I now turn. 
 Discussing the 'social structure' of so various and enormous a 
culture area as the Middle East must lead to over-
simplifications, but it is nonetheless possible to make some 
general statements for heuristic purposes.  Here I only want to 
stress the historical dialectic between center and periphery  
noted first by Ibn Khaldun, the great Muslim social theorist of 
the 15th century.  Ibn Khaldun argued that centralized states in 
the Middle East were highly unstable, despite their pretensions 
to absolute power.  Reliant primarily on trade for revenue, they 
were surrounded by inhospitable countryside full of well-armed 
tribesmen ready, willing and very able to cut the trade routes 
and threaten the state's existence.  The state itself, weakened 
from within by a decay of values and a disintegration of the 
dynastic unity that Ibn Khaldun called asibiya (literally 'group 
feeling') was likely to become prey to a tribe, which would 
conquer the state, and then would itself begin its own slow 
process of disintegration xxxv. 
 Nor was this pattern confined solely to the Maghreb and central 
Arabian lands xxxvi.  For instance, in Persia, where imperial 
power had a traditional pre-Islamic ratification, the state 
nonetheless had little cohesion, nor could it maintain actual 
control over the outlands.  Here too, as in Ibn Khaldun's 
homeland, difficult desert regions and hidden mountain valleys 
provided refuges for large and well-armed tribal populations, 
making government domination over the periphery practically 
impossible.  Thus, instead of the all-powerful central state 
portrayed by imperial edicts there was a polity in which "all 
offices and ranks are unstable" xxxvii and where outside the 
range of immediate state domination 'little republics' of 
independent and self-sufficient herdsmen and farmers were 
organized not by government, but by their own custom xxxviii. 
 It is custom that is of special importance here.  For Ibn 
Khaldun, the tribes were impoverished, independent, 'pure', and 
egalitarian; able to cooperate together because of asibiya.  
According to Ibn Khaldun, this estimable 'group feeling' was the 
special ingredient that permitted the tribes occasionally to 
unite together and ride out of the desert wasteland to overwhelm 
a corrupt and decadent state, thereby establishing a new 
dynasty; and it was the erosion of asibiya through the 
unavoidable development of invidious distinctions of wealth and 
power among the triumphant tribesmen that led in turn to the 
inexorable downfall of their dynasty under the heel of a new 
conqueror from the periphery. 
 The source and nature of 'group feeling' was left more or less 
unstated by Ibn Khaldun - tribesmen had it, urbanites didn't.  
But it clearly corresponded to the characteristic tribal 
patrilineal kinship structure.  This segmentary organization was 
one in which "formally equal elements are defined by 
contradistinction, and formal inequality is admissible only in 
terms of the inclusion of subsets in larger sets"  xxxix.  In its 
ideal workings, subsets are capable of uniting in opposition 
against other structurally equivalent subsets by utilizing the 
idiom of blood relations, as illustrated in the famous Middle 
Eastern axiom: "I against my brothers, my brothers and I against 
my cousins, my cousins, my brothers and I against the world".  
This system could help unite large groups against external 
opposition, but usually was utilized to organize and balance 
opposition in local level squabbles between close relatives 
continually contending for dominance over one another.  In its 
actual workings, the segmentary organization was hardly static, 
but permitted considerable manipulation, as alliances shifted 
among sets of rivalrous cousins and other kinsmen xl.  
 Local tribes, in short, were politically structured by kinship 
and feud among equal men and their personal allies and enemies; 
all members were obliged to take part whether they wanted to or 
not, since, as Black-Michaud has written, "in feuding societies 
no one can opt out of the struggle is he is to survive" xli. In 
other words, participation was obligatory, on pain of death or 
dishonor.   
 Not surprisingly, Muslim tribal peoples, far from being 
politically naive, were and remain extremely astute at 
understanding the manuevers involved in real politik, since each 
man quite realistically sees himself as a sovereign state, with 
unreliable friends and rapacious enemies, all struggling for 
respect and survival in a never ending contest that no one can 
really win xlii.  The rural Middle East then is a pre-eminently 
'political' society, a world of struggle among men who see 
themselves as free agents in a competitive universe of co-
equals. 
   Although Ibn Khaldun located the 'tribal' ethic in the 
periphery, it was not absent from urban life.  Instead, there 
was a "persistance - among both peasantry and aristocracy - of 
tribal affiliations and tribal ideology.... Social relations 
were represented in terms of kinship and descent, and at a 
higher level in terms of segment and tribe, all of these social 
and political forms expressing reciprocity and equality within 
the rural 'community'" xliii. In fact, throughout the Middle 
East, a sense of 'group feeling' prevailed among the localized 
urban guilds, neighborhoods and Sufi brotherhoods, who used ties 
of kinship (both real and fictive) in a way very much like the 
'tribal' organization Ibn Khaldun valorized, binding men 
together in "dislocated, self-contained and almost self-
governing groups, subject only to the overriding authority of 
the temporal and spiritual powers" xliv.  Like their country 
counterparts, these local groups also had little love for the 
state that taxed and regulated them, and rulers had to be 
careful not to offend them for fear of riots. 
 There is a strong affirmation in all of these small-scale local 
groups - whether desert nomads, mountain farmers or urban 
craftsmen - that each adult male participant, as a co-equal 
member of the group, has an absolute right to take part in local 
political discussion and activity.  In both the city and the 
countryside, democratic local assemblies gathered to weigh 
issues, debate, contend, and make collective decisions about 
their affairs, which could mean deciding when to move the herd, 
settling a dispute over land, admitting a member to the guild, 
debating the rights of a neighbor to blood money, agreeing to 
take part in a camel raid, and so on.  In these open gatherings 
skills at argument and rhetoric were highly valued, as equal 
contestants tried to persuade others to their points of view xlv.   
Occasionally mediators, often from saintly lineages, were asked 
to settle complex or especially contentious disputes.  The 
positions held by these arbitrators were elective and 
transitory, and though honored, they were reckoned to be 
servants of the community, though under proper circumstances 
they could assume power - especially in times of stress or 
invasion, when the tribesmen might unite behind them xlvi.  
   Even under the direct domination of the state, or under the 
authority of a chief who was nominally part of the state 
apparatus, men continued to make local decisions themselves.  
The Basseri shepherds of Iran, for example, were administered by 
an appointee from the King, but the actual headmen who were his 
representatives in local camps nonetheless had no real power to 
make decisions, but instead had to "rely on compromise, 
persuasion, and a keen awareness of the drift of group opinion" 
xlvii.  The state, after all, was concerned primarily with 
collecting taxes and avoiding rebellion.  As long as the local 
population were quiet and paid their dues they were left alone 
to settle their own problems and keep to their customary 
democratic procedures.  
 We have then an apparently paradoxical situation.  The 
precolonial Middle Eastern state, typically presented as 
completely without any space for participatory citizenship, 
nonetheless had within it multiple local-level democracies in 
which men who conceived themselves as equals freely debated 
issues of importance and decided together on courses of action.  
But this is only a seeming inconsistency, derived from the 
common Western assumption that the realm of citizenship and the 
realm of the state are co-terminus.  In the traditional Islamic 
world it was just the opposite; the practice of democratic 
action was only possible as long as the state was excluded, 
since any formal hierarchy is by definition oppressive and 
illegitimate, to be borne only if inescapable.  Political action 
is undertaken among co-equals, at the local level, and is 
structured by the solidary yet internally competitive principles 
of asibiya. 
 The despotism of the center in the premodern Middle East can be 
then understood at least in part not as a result of an absence 
of a democratic and egalitarian tradition, but rather as a 
response to just such a tradition.  Those who do hold power must 
manifest it ruthlessly, since they have no other means to assert 
their control over their co-equals.  Within the state Ibn 
Khaldun traces the consequences of this deep-rooted egalitarian 
ideal, as the new king banishes his contentious tribal allies 
and emasculates and enslaves his immediate retainers, since 
slaves and eunuchs, unlike co-equal kinsmen, are completely 
dependent on their master, and consequently are willing to serve 
xlviii.  This attitude is epitomized by the `Abbasid caliph al-
Mansur's candidly stated preference for mawla (dependent 
clients) in his entourage:  
"When I sit in public audience, I may call a Mawla and 
raise him and seat him by my side, so that his knee 
will rub my knee.  As soon, however, as the audience 
is over, I may order him to groom my riding animal and 
he will be content with this and will not take 
offence.  But if I demand the same thing from somebody 
else, he will say:'I am the son of your supporter and 
intimate associate' or 'I am a veteran of your cause' 
or 'I am the son of those who were the first to join 
your cause'" xlix. 
For Ibn Khaldun, the development of slave entourages is the 
beginning of the end of any dynasty, since it means the 
destruction of asibiya; yet kings must follow this course, or 
risk the continued rivalry of those within their kin group who, 
in principle, will not endure the authority of a man they 
perceive to be simply one of the band of brothers.  
Conclusion 
 To reiterate, I have argued that the classic Western image of 
the traditional Middle East as the home of unfreedom is apt in 
one sense, insofar as it refers to the state, but quite wrong 
when it refers to local political action.  This misunderstanding 
is due to a blurring of the logically distinct notions of the 
state and the public realm, a blurring which may fit the general 
case in the West, but is not applicable in the context of the 
Middle East, where the public life of local level political 
participation only occurred outside the confines of the state. 
 The characteristic dichotomy between state and civic life in 
Islam was related in the first instance to an historical 
process: the loss of faith in the legitimacy of the state after 
the charismatic reign of the Prophet and the 'rightly guided' 
Caliphs.  After this millennial moment, central authority in the 
Middle East did indeed become despotic and the possibility of 
public participation in the kingdom was deeply eroded, as pious 
Muslims withdrew from service to a state that had been 
desacralized and rationalized, accepting rule by any ostensible 
Muslim as preferable to social anarchy (fitna).  
 But I indicated as well that the despotism of the government had 
a structural base, as the state struggled to hold off the 
encroachments of armed, independent,ideologically egalitarian 
and dangerously quarrelsome peripheral tribes, and also to fend 
off resistance from within by similarly structured urban guilds, 
brotherhoods and neighborhoods. And, most importantly, the ruler 
needed to subordinate his own close kinsmen and allies, who saw 
him simply as one of themselves, without any special powers 
whatsoever.   
 As we have seen, it was at the fractious level of personal 
rivalries and alliances - Ibn Khaldun's asibiya - that the 
public realm of participation and citizenship, as we understand 
it in the West, was to be found. But due to the historical 
delegitimizing of government itself and the consequent lack of 
any ideal of community beyond asibiya these local public worlds 
were conceived as an arena not for service to a wider ideal, but 
rather for individual displays of power and the maximization of 
pride; in this sense, state and local politics are equivalent in 
their pragmatism and desacralized quality l. 
 In this situation, traditions of democracy, equality, and 
participation in the rivalries of the local polity trained men 
to value their freedom from domination, but did not necessarily 
lead to any wider sense of citizenship beyond the basic 
community of mutual defense and group loyalty li.  Rather, 
individual free agents acting within the mythical charter of 
equality and independence, and lacking the notion of public 
service and moral government, hoped to become a tyrants 
themselves, and felt no great moral horror at another man's 
enactment of the cultural ideal.  Fredrik Barth explains the 
logic of this position: 
"Independence and personal sovereignty were highly, 
perhaps inordinately, valued; but they were 
conceptualized as goods for each to seek for himself, 
not as rights for all, to be collectively safeguarded 
by all.  A person who commanded effective and 
sufficient sanctions to dominate and exploit others 
was not particularly condemned and his acts were not 
collectively resisted - indeed he would rather be 
admired and sought as ally and leader, unless he was 
so feared for the threat he might pose to one's own  
autonomy that one sought to build a defensive faction 
against him" lii. 
In the premodern Middle East, a combination of local autonomy 
and central tyranny was often the consequence of this attitude. 
 Clearly, this pattern serves as a lesson that we should be 
careful not to romanticize democratic and egalitarian local 
structures in themselves; when individuals lack a public goal or 
legitimized governmental framework, and are motivated solely by 
a desire for personal aggrandizement and asibiya, local 
independence may easily coincide with national tyranny, and 
democratic communities may produce aspiring dictators rather 
than citizens. 
 Yet we should also note that Islam has provided an alternative 
overarching community that transcends the secular realms of both 
the state and the locality.  Pious Muslims who withdraw from the 
tainted world of local manipulation and national government 
could find a sacralized unity with their brothers and sisters in 
the great tradition of the pilgrimage and the fast, and in their 
shared prayers offered to a common God, toward whom all Muslims 
may equally strive once they realize the futility of earthly 
struggles.  It is to this sacred realm that Muslims look when 
they hope for a legitimate ruler. 
 However, because Islam is a religion where the millennium has 
already come and gone, the attempt to convert personal sanctity 
to political power can never succeed, since the very assumption 
of power must, by its nature, tragically undermine the piety of 
the ruler, who must bow to the cruel necessities of pragmatic 
rule if he wishes to survive as governor liii.   
 And so the historical acceptance of 'Oriental despotism' in the 
Middle East is not a result of Muslims' supposed excessive 
passivity and a slavish devotion to power; rather it is the 
reverse: the consequence of transcendent hopes and a consuming 
passion for equality; yearning for far more from politics than 
the West, Islam has historically been obliged to settle for 
less.  
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i Ibn Jama'a quoted in Von Grunebaum 1956: 169. 
ii Proverb cited by Ibn Taimiyya, quoted in Rosenthal 1973: 6.   
iii  Ibn Hanbal, quoted in Ahmed 1988. 
iv Hegel 1944: 105. 
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vi Gibb and Bowen 1950: 31. 
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viii cf. Daniel 1960, Asad 1975, Said 1978, Southern 1962. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
ix Quoted in Gibb 1955: 19. 
x Quoted in Seligman 1964: 19. 
xi Quoted in Von Grunebaum 1956: 169. 
xii Burkhardt 1829: 149. 
xiii Gibb and Bowen 1950: 39. 
xiv Geertz 1979: 239. 
xv Gellner 1981: 28, Geertz 1979: 141. 
xvi Barth 1985: 175, 173.  Barth was writing about the small 
Pakistani kingdom of Swat, where I also did my fieldwork, but his 
insights run parallel with the findings of other researchers in most 
Middle Eastern contexts. 
xvii I use the controversial term 'tribal' here advisedly.  It does 
not in any sense mean a group cut off from and independent of the 
larger Islamic context.  Indeed, tribe and state in the Middle East 
have always existed together, the urban area is itself made up of 
'tribals' and ex-tribal peoples, and tribe and state are both avowedly 
Muslim.  'Tribe' is, however, a useful shorthand term to refer to 
these peripheral peoples who see themselves as outside of and opposed 
to the state, and who understand their world as organized on the basis 
of kinship and clanship, and on personal ties of honor and obligation. 
xviii Eickelman 1976:143. 
xix   Tribes thus saw themselves as in a real sense superior to 
urbanites - a view that was, surprisingly, accepted in some measure by 
city-dwellers.  The Middle East is perhaps the only great culture area 
to valorize the periphery in this way. Though rustics were also seen 
by Middle Eastern sophisticates as uncouth and dangerous, there was no 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
demonizing and degrading of peripheral tribal  peoples as is found in 
China, for example, or Greece.  To this day, in fact, Middle Eastern 
urbanites are proud of their tribal backgrounds, and perhaps send 
their children to spend some time in the hinterland to learn tribal 
virtues. 
xx     Gellner 1981:30, 28. Gellner here follows Ibn Khaldun, who will 
be discussed in more detail later. 
xxi    Sunni Muslims, who constitute the vast majority of the Islamic 
world, honor the first four Caliphs as companions of the Prophet and 
as exemplary leaders.  The Shi`ites, on the other hand, reject the 
first three Caliphs as usurpers, and hold only Ali to be legitimate.  
In this paper, my concern will be primarily with Sunni Islam. 
xxii   Of course, such radical egalitarianism sparks countercurrents, 
and claims to belong to the lineage of the Prophet, or to noble Arab 
lineages, or to lines of spiritually enlightened persons, are used to 
this day to argue in favor of granting a higher status to certain 
individuals.  But even these claims must be validated by 
demonstrations of personal spiritual capacity and are always met with 
considerable skepticism on the part of the ordinary Muslim (the 
Shi`ite tradition takes a different pathway, valorizing the sacred 
authority of certain spiritual leaders). 
xxiii   The similarities to militant Calvinism are manifest, and have 
been argued for by a number of authors, most notably Gellner (1981) 
and Goldberg (1992).  Of course, there are also major differences 
between the trajectories of these two religious annunciations.  Here I 
want to stress the fact that the Muslim claim to a unity of sacred and 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
secular power was far more spectacularly successful than the 
Calvinists (or any other religion) ever were.  Muslim disillusionment 
with state politics was also even greater, as we shall see. 
xxiv  The constitution also protected the rights of the Jewish clients 
who lived at Medina.  Their religion was to be tolerated, and any harm 
done them was considered equivalent to harm done to their patrons. 
xxv   Serjeant argues that this pattern is deep rooted in the region.  
"Muhammad acted in accordance with Arabian political patterns in 
existence from the remote past.  In one sense he is simply a judge-
arbiter, a hakam, like his series of ancestors, and he was responsible 
for but few modifications to Arabian law and society" (Serjeant 1981: 
1-2). 
xxvi   The actual history of the Islamic state thus parallels the 
imaginary history of the state postulated by Hobbes - but with the 
vital difference that the Islamic state is founded not on self 
interest, but on principles of justice and a transcendent annunciation 
xxvii Cornelius 1979: 51. 
xxviii Seligman 1964: 14. 
xxix Letter from Ali in 658, quoted in Jafri 1979: 12. 
xxx  Graham 1992: 7.  For this reason, transformative 'fundamentalist' 
movements in Islamic societies claim to be reawakening the pure form 
of the faith.  These calls can mobilize opposition to secular rule, 
but face a problem when successful, since they are measured against 
the time of the Prophet, and inevitably found lacking. 
xxxi Rosenthal 1973:13. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
xxxii   Even when the Caliph was removed, it was done in a way that 
would satisfy Islamic law - his eyes were put out, and he was then 
deposed for blindness. 
xxxiii Crone 1980: 63. 
xxxiv Mottahedeh 1980: 187, 189, 173. 
xxxv See Gellner 1981, Seddon 1978, for modern formulations of Ibn 
Khaldun's classic model (1967). 
xxxvi  I would argue that the pattern is relatively typical throughout 
the Middle East save in Egypt and Turkey, both of which are 
characterized by large and relatively easily controlled 'peasant' 
agriculturalist populations and a related absence of dangerous 
'tribal' groups on the periphery. 
xxxvii Eickelman 1981: 199. 
xxxviii For this argument, see Abrahamian 1975, who is elaborating 
on Marx's discussion of the Germanic mode of production. 
xxxix Dresch 1986: 321. 
xl  The real salience of this system (known technically as a 
segmentary lineage system) for actual political alliances has been the 
object of much controversy in the anthropological community, 
stimulated by Emrys Peter's debunking essays on Cyrenaica (1967, 
1970).  By all accounts, however, patrilineal kinship ties are 
iinevitably cited by local people themselves as the primary reason for 
alliances, and kinship links are unquestionably an extremely important 
element in the way these alliances are played out.  From my point of 
view, although many other factors also may be relevant in any specific 
case, dismissing the factor of kinship is totally unwarranted, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
especially when the ideology of equality is so deeply intertwined with 
kinship organization, and when kinship is the factor utilized 
indigenously for explanation.  For more on this controversy, see 
Lindholm 1986. 
xli Black-Michaud 1975. 
xlii These rivalrous 'tribal' societies, of course, were not all alike 
in terms of the authority systems and social structures they entail.  
Nomadic shepherds, for instance, tend to develop organizational 
leaders, often notables imported from outside the tribal structure, 
who can help co-ordinate the complex movements of people and animals 
and who can mediate with the farmers whose land must be crossed.  
These leaders are often affiliated with the state, which uses them to 
collect tribute.   Camel nomads, on the other hand, have less need of 
any central organization, are usually free of the state, and have 
social systems that permit flexibility of movement, but that also 
allow for undertaking large scale feuds and camel raids.  Here lines 
between lineage segments going back five to seven generations are 
fairly strictly drawn, and 'blood money' is paid not to individuals, 
but to lineages.  In contrast, free farmers and mixed 
agriculturalists, living in mountain valleys, often have 'party' 
structures of alliances, drawing people together in dualistic factions 
that cross-cut kinship on the principle of "the enemy of my enemy is 
my friend," and are marked by a fairly narrow range of blood 
responsibility (cf. Cole 1975, Beck 1986, Lindholm 1982). 
xliii Seddon 1978: 84 - 87. 
xliv Gibb and Bowen 1950: 277. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
xlv  Note that the democratic and egalitarian framework did not 
preclude exclusion of certain groups regarded as 'naturally' inferior, 
such as slaves, clients, and women, since only free Muslim males are 
considered full human beings. Due to their subordination, slaves and 
clients are considered feminized and without male rights (see Lindholm 
1992).  A similar 'naturalization' of inferiority in an egalitarian 
society is the ideology of race in the United States (see Dumont 
1970). 
xlvi  See Morsy 1984, Lindholm 1981, 82 for cases.  Given the actual 
weakness of the state in the Middle East, mediation becomes of crucial 
importance for power holding; so much so that Brian Turner argues that 
the typical Middle Eastern state keeps its position not by force, but 
as a mediator "playing one section of the community off against 
another" (Turner 1974: 101).  From this perspective, the Middle 
Eastern ruler, far from being the absolute tyrant he appears to be on 
the surface, actually ruled only by maintaining a precarious balance 
between hostile groups. 
xlvii Barth 1961: 81. 
xlviii   Patricia Crone, Daniel Pipes (1981), and myself have argued 
that "the Islamic deprivation of legitimating resources" (Crone 
1980:80) correlated with the unusual predominance of slave dynasties 
in the Middle East, the argument being that where rule itself is 
illegitimate, government by a slave caste is highly likely.   The 
dominance of the Ottoman Empire can also be explained within this 
framework, since it was structured along Central Asian lines of 
primogeniture and hierarchy, which gave it stability over time.  This 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
permitted the Ottoman Sultan to sit above the rivalrous Middle Eastern 
system, acting as mediator and tax collector, but generally avoiding 
intervention in local politics (see Lindholm 1986 for this argument). 
xlix   Quoted in Ayalon 1975: 49. 
l  This tension can be seen in the multiple meanings of qabaday - 
local gang leaders in Beruit.  The term means: henchman, strong arm, 
bully, and hero. The Arabic word futawwa, which is used for the heads 
of neighborhood gangs in Cairo has similar ambiguous meanings: bold, 
protector, pious, outlaw, bully.  These figures are local men who used 
strength, reputation, and family connections to take positions of 
leadership in their neighborhoods.  They were opposed to the state, 
and renowned for their courage, generosity, ruthlessness and 
willingness to use violence - not only against outsiders, but against 
internal rivals as well - hence they are both defenders and 
oppressors. 
li The Middle Eastern pattern outlined here stands in contrast to 
Tocqueville's analysis of the American case (1969). 
lii Barth 1985: 169. 
liii  Shi`ism again may be an exception, as the tradition of the imam 
permits at least a temporary acceptance of sacred rule, as we have 
recently seen in Iran.  However, the circumstances of Iran are not 
applicable to the rest of the Middle East (Munson 1988). 
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